The nucleolus of the assignment game. Structure of the family

Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Carlos Rafels (crafels@ub.edu) and Neus Ybern (neus.ybern@upc.edu)
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Carlos Rafels: Universitat de Barcelona
Neus Ybern: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya

No 2018/386, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus forms a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element. The above family is in general not a convex set, but path-connected.

Keywords: Assignment game; core; nucleolus; semilattice. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ewp:wpaper:386web

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