Assortative multisided assignment games. The extreme core points

F.Javier Martínez de Albéniz (javier.martinezdealbeniz@ub.edu), Carlos Rafels (crafels@ub.edu) and Neus Ybern (neus.ybern@upc.edu)
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F.Javier Martínez de Albéniz: Universitat de Barcelona
Carlos Rafels: Universitat de Barcelona
Neus Ybern: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz

No 2019/395, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players’ abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained.

Keywords: Assortative market; assignment game; multisided assignment game; core; extreme core allocations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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