On Convexity in Games with Externalities
José María Alsonso-Maijide (),
María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro () and
Andrés Jiménez-Losada ()
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José María Alsonso-Maijide: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro: Universidade de Vigo
Andrés Jiménez-Losada: Universidad de Sevilla
No 2019/398, UB Economics Working Papers from Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB School of Economics
We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities.
Keywords: Externalities; Partition function; Lattice; Superadditivity; Convexity; Contribution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ewp:wpaper:398web
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