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On Convexity in Games with Externalities

José María Alsonso-Maijide (), Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro () and Andrés Jiménez-Losada ()
Additional contact information
José María Alsonso-Maijide: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro: Universidade de Vigo
Andrés Jiménez-Losada: Universidad de Sevilla

No 2019/398, UB Economics Working Papers from Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB School of Economics

Abstract: We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities.

Keywords: Externalities; Partition function; Lattice; Superadditivity; Convexity; Contribution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-upt
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