Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems

Pedro Calleja () and Francesc Llerena ()
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Pedro Calleja: Universitat de Barcelona and BEAT
Francesc Llerena: Universitat Rovira i Virgili and ECO-SOS

No 2022/426, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In the domain of bankruptcy problems, we show that non manipulability via merging and splitting claims by identical agents characterizes the proportional rule provided claims are positive rational numbers. By adding either claim monotonicity or claims continuity we obtain new characterizations to the whole class of bankruptcy problems.

Keywords: Rationing problems; manipulability; proportionality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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