Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
Pedro Calleja () and
Francesc Llerena ()
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Pedro Calleja: Universitat de Barcelona and BEAT
Francesc Llerena: Universitat Rovira i Virgili and ECO-SOS
No 2022/426, UB Economics Working Papers from Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB School of Economics
In the domain of bankruptcy problems, we show that non manipulability via merging and splitting claims by identical agents characterizes the proportional rule provided claims are positive rational numbers. By adding either claim monotonicity or claims continuity we obtain new characterizations to the whole class of bankruptcy problems.
Keywords: Rationing problems; manipulability; proportionality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ewp:wpaper:426web
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