Information Acquisition in Deliberative Democracies

Gerard Domènech-Gironell (), Caio Lorecchio () and Oriol Tejada ()
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Gerard Domènech-Gironell: Universitat de Barcelona, BEAT
Caio Lorecchio: Universitat de Barcelona, BEAT
Oriol Tejada: Universitat de Barcelona, BEAT

No 2024/479, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We examine the impact of deliberation on political learning and election outcomes. A rational, common-valued electorate votes under majority rule, after potentially acquiring costly private information and sharing it freely through public deliberation. Our findings suggest that deliberation can lead to free-riding on information gathering, but also encourage the emergence of informed political experts. Overall, deliberation may legitimize purely electoral outcomes and yield more accurate decisions. However, deliberation may also reduce electoral accuracy. We provide conditions for these results and contribute to the understanding of the strengths and limitations of deliberative democracies.

Keywords: Elections; Information Acquisition; Deliberation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2024
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