Democratic backsliding in times of crisis

Artyom Jelnov () and Maxim Senkov ()
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Artyom Jelnov: Ariel University
Maxim Senkov: Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics. Universitat de Barcelona and BEAT

No 2026/495, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In a political-agency model, an incumbent can initiate a restrictive policy in response to a crisis state of the world. Both the opposition and the citizen value the incumbent's policy matching the state; however, they are uncertain about the incumbent's true motives. If the incumbent is of the dictatorial type, a restrictive policy that is not protested by both the opposition and the citizen leads to the start of authoritarian rule. We show that when the incumbent is relatively unlikely to be dictatorial, the presence of radical opposition, protesting the restrictive policy regardless circumstances, can reduce voter welfare: it eliminates the efficient state-matching equilibrium, since the opposition never fully reveals dictatorial incumbents. Conversely, when the incumbent is relatively likely to be dictatorial, a high probability of radical opposition can increase voter welfare by deterring the dictatorial type from implementing the restrictive policy.

Keywords: democratic backsliding; autocratization; emergency powers; populist radical parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2026
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