Cooperating to Resist Coercion: An Experimental Study
Lucy Ackert (),
Ann B. Gillette and
Mark Rider ()
No 2011-02, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University
This study sheds light on the difficulties people face in cooperating to resist coercion. We adapt a threshold public goods game to investigate whether people are able to cooperate to resist coercion despite individual incentives to free-ride. Behavior in this resistance game is similar to that observed in multi-period public goods games. Specifically, we observe "out-of-equilibrium" outcomes and a decrease in successful resistance in later periods of a session compared to earlier ones. Nevertheless, cooperation remains relatively high even in the later periods. Finally, we find that increasing the resistance threshold has a substantial negative effect on the probability of successful resistance.
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D63 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2011-02
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by J. Todd Swarthout ().