A Large Poisson Currency Crises Game: Towards a Theory of Both the Onset and the Swiftness of Currency Attacks

M. Makris

Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: Existing models of self-fulfilling crises fail to explain both the onset and the abruptness of recent currency attacks. In this apper we follow the suggestion by Myerson (1998) that in games with a very large number of players 'a more realistic model should admit some uncertainty about the number of players in the game.' In particular, we build a Large Poisson Currency Crises Game which turns out to be consistent with sudden attacks and unique equilibrium.

Keywords: GAMES; MODELS; EXCHANGE RATE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D89 F31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:0015

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sebastian Kripfganz ().