Preferred Bidders' Curse in a Simultaneous Ascending Auction with a Case Study on an Australian Broadband Spectrum Auction

T. Romsas and D. Sasaki

Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we try shedding light on the two popular questions on spectrum licensing auctions: [1] whether any geographical synergies between licences can be detected, and if so, what would be possible alternatives and pros and cons thereof, and [2] whether the provision of entrants-only licences truly serve to protect new (hence less established) entrants and encourage their participation. Our empirical analysis on [1] is mixed and inconclusive, leaving some concerns on the broadly adopted auction mechanism that ignores any potential synergistic interlink between geographically adjacent licences. The Australian data also serves to cast a fresh doubt against [2], which we follow up by a simple theoretical discussion.

Keywords: PRIVATISATION; AUCTIONS; GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:0016

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