On the Evolutionary Selection of Nash Equilibrium Components
Dieter Balkenborg and
Karl Schlag ()
No 106, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics
It is well known for the common multi-population evolutionary dynamics applied to normal form games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict equilibrium point. We extend this result to sets as follows. For certain regular selection dynamics every connected and closed asymptotically stable set of rest points containing a pure strategy combination is a strict equilibrium set and hence a Nash equilibrium component. A converse statement holds for two person games, for convex strict equilibrium sets and for the standard replicator dynamic.
Keywords: evolutionary dynamics; replicator dynamic; regular selection dynamics; strict equilibrium set; Nash equilibrium component. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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