All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards

Todd Kaplan

No 109, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study all-pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder!s privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid

Keywords: All-Pay Auctions; Contests; R & D Races; Rent-Seeking. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:0109

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