EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Imperfect Competition, Indirect Tax Harmonization and Public Goods

Christos Kotsogiannis and Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia ()

No 501, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a recent contribution Keen, Lahiri and Raimondos-MØller (2002) (European Economic Review, 46, 1559-1568), in a model of imperfect competition with no revenue e?ects, show that tax harmonization under the destination principle always makes one country better o? and maybe Pareto-improving, whereas under the origin principle, and under certain circumstances, it leads to a strict Pareto-worsening. This paper shows that the welfare implications of (destination- and origin-based) tax harmonization are, in general, indeterminate when public goods are present. A consequence of this is that the choice of the tax principle and the harmonization of tax rates across countries can be considered in isolation.

Keywords: Origin principle; destination principle; indirect tax harmonization; reform of commodity taxes; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F15 H21 H41 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://people.exeter.ac.uk/RePEc/dpapers/DP0501.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Imperfect competition, indirect tax harmonization and public goods (2007) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:0501

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen ().

 
Page updated 2020-03-29
Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:0501