Market distortions and corporate governance

David Kelsey and Frank Milne

No 503, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies corporate governance when a firm operates in imperfect markets. We derive firms' decisions from utility maximisation by individuals. This reduces the usual monopoly distortion. Corporate governance can effect the equilibrium in the product (or input) markets. This enables us to endogenise the objective function of the firm. If the firm cannot commit not to change its constitution, we find a Coase-like result where all market power is lost in the limit. We present a more abstract model of governance in the presence of market distortions and discuss its implications for the governance of universities.

Keywords: corporate governance; stakeholder; strategic delegation; economics of universities. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 L13 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://exetereconomics.github.io/RePEc/dpapers/DP0503.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:0503

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sebastian Kripfganz ().