Ambiguity and Social Interaction

Jürgen Eichberger, David Kelsey and Burkhard Schipper

No 504, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the e?ect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the e?ects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.

Keywords: Ambiguity; Optimism; Oligopoly; Peace-making; Choquet expected utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D62 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://exetereconomics.github.io/RePEc/dpapers/DP0504.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Ambiguity and social interaction (2009)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and Social Interaction (2007)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and Social Interaction (2005)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and Social Interaction (2005)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and social interaction (2003)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and Social Interaction (2003)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and Social Interaction (2003)
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