Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint

Miltiadis Makris

No 601, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: Consider an agent who has an expertise in producing a non-marketable good. This good is valued by a single principal, and there is a veri able measure of the agent's performance. Crucially, the agent is intrinsically motivated, due to `warm glow altruism'. In addition, the agent's budget, which is controlled by the principal, must not be less than the monetary performance-cost faced by the agent. This gives rise to a limited-liability constraint. It also restricts the agent's ability to under-report costs. In such environment, we determine the link between the agent's budget and performance. Our results come in contrast to the received solution of the principal-agent problem, and to most in the literature on mission-motivated organisations and public services provision.

Keywords: Mission-orientated Organisations; Asymmetric Information; Administrative Constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D82 H11 H41 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://exetereconomics.github.io/RePEc/dpapers/DP0601.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint (2009)
Working Paper: Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:0601

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sebastian Kripfganz ().