Universal banking, competition and risk in a macro model

Tatiana Damjanovic (), Vladislav Damjanovic and Charles Nolan

No 1201, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: A stylized macroeconomic model is developed with an indebted, heterogeneous Investment Banking Sector funded by borrowing from a retail banking sector. The government guarantees retail deposits. Investment banks choose how risky their activities should be. We find that the financial sector can move very sharply from safe to risky investment strategies and that the degree of competitiveness is important for risk premia. We also compared the benefits of separated vs. universal banking modelled as a vertical integration of the retail and investment banks. The incidence of banking default is considered under different constellations of shocks and degrees of competitiveness. The benefits of universal banking rise in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks to trading strategies and are positive even for very bad common shocks, even though government bailouts, which are costly, are larger compared to the case of separated banking entities. The benefits of universal banking are positive but decreasing in the value and volatility of shocks to the quality of financial capital. When shock is moderate, competition improves the welfare. However, banks with some market power have a cushion of profits against adverse shocks which is beneficial since there is an excess burden associated with government bailouts. Hence, when a worse shock hits the economy, the optimal degree of competitiveness of separate banking firms is higher than for universal firms. So, the welfare assessment of the structure of banks may depend crucially on the kinds of shock hitting the economy as well as on the efficiency of government intervention.

Keywords: Risk in DSGE models; investment banking; financial intermediation; separating commercial and investment banking; competition and risk; moral hazard in banking; prudential regulation; systematic vs. idiosyncratic risks. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E13 E44 G11 G24 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-dge and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://exetereconomics.github.io/RePEc/dpapers/DP1201.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Universal banking, competition and risk in a macro model (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:1201

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sebastian Kripfganz ().