Dragon Slaying with Ambiguity: Theory and Experiments
Sara le Roux () and
No 1506, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics
This paper studies the impact of ambiguity in the best shot and weakest link models of public good provision. The models are ?rst analysed theoretically. Then we conduct experiments to study how ambiguity affects behaviour in these games. We test whether subjects? perception of ambiguity differs between a local opponent and a foreign one. We fi?nd that an ambiguity safe strategy, is often chosen by subjects. This is compatible with the hypothesis that ambiguity aversion infl?uences behaviour in games. Subjects tend to choose contributions above (resp. below) the Nash equilibrium in the Best Shot (resp. Weakest Link) model.
Keywords: Public goods; Ambiguity; Choquet expected utility; strategic complements; weakest link; best shot. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D03 D81 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Dragon Slaying with Ambiguity: Theory and Experiments (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:1506
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