Trade, Law and Order, and Political Liberties: Theory and Application to English Medieval Boroughs

Charles Angelucci and Simone Meraglia
Additional contact information
Charles Angelucci: Columbia Business School, Columbia University.
Simone Meraglia: Department of Economics, University of Exeter

No 1509, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: We argue that trade opportunities, combined with the provision of law and order, may lead to local political liberties. In our model, a ruler chooses the size of an administration that (i) provides law and order for a merchant to use and (ii) collects taxes. Larger gains from trade increase the demand for law and order, which requires a larger administration. However, a larger administration is more difficult to monitor and allow local officials to expropriate merchants. When the resulting inefficiencies are significant, the ruler delegates control of the administration to the better-informed merchant, even though this makes tax evasion more tempting. We then analyze the emergence of local political liberties in post-Norman Conquest England (1066-1307) using data on taxation, commerce, and the behavior of local officials. This period marks the beginning of England's transition away from feudalism. We find that trade expansion coincides with widespread misbehavior by officials and, in line with the predictions of our model, an increasing willingness by the king to grant boroughs of high commercial value the right to elect local officials.

Keywords: Institutions; Law and Order; Bureaucracy; Trade; Medieval England. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D73 N43 P14 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://exetereconomics.github.io/RePEc/dpapers/DP1509.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:1509

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sebastian Kripfganz (s.kripfganz@exeter.ac.uk).