Fiscal Policy, Public Debt Stabilization and Politics: Theory and Evidence from the US and UK
Ben Lockwood (),
Apostolis Philippopoulos and
Andy Snell ()
Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics
This paper presents a two-party model of fiscal and debt policy which; (i) explicitly models the partisan, stabilisation, and (to some extent) survival motives of politicians; (ii) has predictions that are largely consistent with existing empirical findings about partisan and electoral effects in government expenditure, tax revenue, and debt; (iii) yields new predictions about how the feedback of fiscal policy on lagged debt may depend on partisan and electoral effects. These new predictions are not rejected by a test of the model on US and UK data.
Keywords: Political business cycles; stabilization; fiscal policy; public debt. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E30 E62 E63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Fiscal Policy, Public Debt Stabilization and Politics: Theory and Evidence from the US and UK (1994)
Working Paper: Fiscal Policy, Public Debt Stabilzation and Politics: Theory and evidence from the US and UK
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:9401
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