Individually Rational Union Membership

George Bulkley () and Gareth Myles ()

Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: The Analysis of the determinants of union membership has typically met difficulties with the free-rider problem that union membership is not individually-rational. We assume that workers differ in their reservation wages and hence in their choice of contracts, preventing free-riding on the contarct choice of others.

Keywords: TRADE; UNIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 H41 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1996
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Related works:
Journal Article: Individually rational union membership (2001)
Working Paper: Individually-Relational Union Membership (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:9612

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