Fiscal Policy, Debt and Coalition Behaviour: Theory and Evidence from Italy

G. Barisone

Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a structural model of optimal fiscal policy in a multiparty system which allows the existence of coalition governments. The paper shows how political effects weaken stabilizing feedback rules from inherited public debt to the current poicy instruments of government expenditure, taxes and debt. It also yileds new predictions about how debt contingent feedback rules may depend on partisan, electoral and type of government effects. These new predictions are supported by a test of the model on Italian data.

Keywords: GOVERNMENT; FISCAL POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 H30 H6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:9714

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sebastian Kripfganz ().