Tax versus Transfer Competition
Jean Hindriks ()
Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics
In a context where both the poor and the rich are (imperfectly) mobile, this paper compares the Nash equilibrium levels of income redistribution from the rich to the poor when jurisdictions compete either in taxes, in transfers or both. Although taxes and transfers are linked through the budget-balanced requirement, the analysis reveals intriguing differences. Indeed, it turns out that transfer competition results in much less redistribution than tax competition, while tax-transfer competition involves an intermediate level of redistribution. In each approach, the mobility of the rich is detrimental to redistribution and an increase in the dependency ratio reduces taxes.
Keywords: TAXES; COMPETITION; INCOME DISTRIBUTION; SOCIAL INEQUALITY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:9808
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen ().