Corruption, Extortion and Evasion

Jean Hindriks, Michael Keen and Abhinay Muthoo

Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: Corruption, evasion and the abuse of power (and the possibility thereof) are pervasive features of economic activity. A prominent instance is tax collection. This paper examines the implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of (potentially non-linear) tax collection schemes.

Keywords: CORRUPTION; POLITICS; SOCIAL CHOICE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D82 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Corruption, extortion and evasion (2002)
Journal Article: Corruption, extortion and evasion (1999)
Working Paper: Corruption, Extortion and Evasion (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:9809

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