Corruption, Extortion and Evasion
Jean Hindriks (),
Michael Keen () and
Abhinay Muthoo ()
Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics
Corruption, evasion and the abuse of power (and the possibility thereof) are pervasive features of economic activity. A prominent instance is tax collection. This paper examines the implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of (potentially non-linear) tax collection schemes.
Keywords: CORRUPTION; POLITICS; SOCIAL CHOICE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D82 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
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Working Paper: Corruption, extortion and evasion (2002)
Journal Article: Corruption, extortion and evasion (1999)
Working Paper: Corruption, Extortion and Evasion (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:9809
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