Interval Bidding in a Distribution Elicitation Format

Pierre-Alexandre Mahieu (), François-Charles Wolff and Jason Shogren

No 2014.16, Working Papers from FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists

Abstract: Interval bidding allows people to report a range of values for a non-market good. Herein we allow people to choose their distribution over this range endogenously. Using elephant protection as our motivating example, our results suggest the shape of the distribution greatly varies across people and the degree of uncertainty is proportional to their willingness to pay. We also find that both the expected willingness to pay and the degree of uncertainty differ when the valuation exercise is real versus hypothetical.

Keywords: Contingent Valuation; Uncertainty; Distribution format. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C5 Q51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://faere.fr/pub/WorkingPapers/Mahieu_Wolff_Shogren_FAERE-WP2014-16.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Interval bidding in a distribution elicitation format (2017)
Working Paper: Interval bidding in a distribution elicitation format (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fae:wpaper:2014.16

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