Marchés internationaux de droits à polluer et taxes locales sur les biens polluants
Julien Daubanes () and
No 2018.18, Working Papers from FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
The interest of international markets for pollution rights lies in their potential to achieve a pollution reduction objective in an efficient manner. Unfortunately, the tendency of participating countries to tax polluting goods locally undermines this potential. We propose a model to examine the interest of countries participating in a market for rights to pollute in taxing the good that generates pollution. In particular, this interest depends on the initial distribution of rights among participating countries. We show how rights should be allocated to the different participating countries in order to ensure market efficiency. These optimal allocations require that a sufficiently large fraction of rights be distributed free of charge rather than auctioned.
Keywords: International cap and trade; local taxes; optimum tariff; optimal allocation of pollution rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q48 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
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Forthcoming in L’Actualité économique – Revue d’analyse économique
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http://faere.fr/pub/WorkingPapers/Daubanes_Lasserre_FAERE_WP2018.18.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fae:wpaper:2018.18
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