Bargaining with Intertemporal Maximin Payoffs
Pedro Gajardo () and
Michel De Lara ()
No 2019.02, Working Papers from FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
We frame sustainability problems as bargaining problems among stakeholders who have to agree on a common development path. For infinite alternatives, the set of feasible payoffs is unknown, limiting the possibility to apply classical bargaining theory and mechanisms. We define a framework accounting for the economic environment, which specifies how the set of alternatives and payoff structure underlie the set of feasible payoffs and disagreement point. A mechanism satisfying the axioms of Independence of Non-Efficient Alternatives and Independence of Redundant Alternatives can be applied to a reduced set of alternatives producing all Pareto-efficient outcomes of the initial problem, and produces the same outcome. We exhibit monotonicity conditions under which such a subset of alternatives is computable. We apply our framework to dynamic sustainability problems. We characterize a « satisficing'' decision rule achieving any Pareto-efficient outcome. This rule is renegotiation-proof and generates a time-consistent path under the axiom of Individual Rationality.
Keywords: social choice; axiomatic bargaining theory; economic environment; monotonicity; sustainability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 Q01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://faere.fr/pub/WorkingPapers/Martinet_Gajardo_De%20Lara_FAERE_WP2019.02.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Bargaining with Intertemporal Maximin Payoffs (2019)
Working Paper: Bargaining with intertemporal maximin payoffs (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fae:wpaper:2019.02
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline ().