Microfinance, Subsidies and Dynamic Incentives

Suman Ghosh () and Eric Van Tassel ()

No 7001, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University

Abstract: In this paper we develop a two period model of a credit market to study the interaction between a monopolistic moneylender and a subsidized microfinance institution. We assume that lenders face a moral hazard problem that is diminished as agents are able to take increased equity positions in their production projects. In this setting, we identify a range of subsidy levels for which the behavior of the moneylender complements the poverty reduction mission of the microfinance institution. We also explain why a policy of offering subsidized loans in the second period to agents who are poor due to a project failure in the prior period, does not distort agents’ incentives to work hard and save in the first period. By varying the subsidy level available to the microfinance institution we discover that for small subsidies the moneylender may be better off with the microfinance institution in the market, and that when subsidies are excessive this can harm the poverty reduction mission of the microfinance institution.

Keywords: microfinance; poverty; moral hazard; contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 G21 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-dev and nep-mfd
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://home.fau.edu/sghosh/web/Ghosh-VanTassel(FinalVersion).pdf First version, 2007 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://home.fau.edu/sghosh/web/Ghosh-VanTassel(FinalVersion).pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://home.fau.edu/sghosh/web/Ghosh-VanTassel(FinalVersion).pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fal:wpaper:07001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Vadym Volosovych ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).