The Comparative Statics of the Effects of Credit Guarantees and Subsidies in the Competitive Lending Market
Karel Janda
No 82, Working Papers IES from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies
Abstract:
We compare the effects of government credit subsidies and guarantees on decreasing inefficiencies caused by principal-agent problems in the credit market in transition and posttransition economies. We show that the guarantees and subsidies targeted to low risk borrowers decrease efficiency while those targeted to high risk borrowers increase efficiency both in transition and post-transition economies. The uniform non-targeted guarantees decrease the credit rationing or dead-weight loss caused by the collateral transfer. The uniform subsidies may be used to improve welfare in the economy subjected to credit rationing, but they do not have any effect on the size of collateral required in post-transition economy.
Keywords: Transition, Credit; Subsidies; Guarantees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G28 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2005, Revised 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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