Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform

Adam Gersl

No 98, Working Papers IES from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies

Abstract: The paper uses a dynamic inconsistency model known from monetary policy to assess three alternative proposals how to reform fiscal constitution in order to limit government’s incentive to use fiscal policy for maximizing political support. The return to ever-balanced-budget rule, state-contingent rules, and the establishment of an independent Fiscal Policy Committee with power to set public deficit with the aim of stabilizing the economy are discussed from the constitutional perspective, analyzing different incentives that these proposals create for government and alternative means to enhance credibility of the arrangement.

Keywords: fiscal policy; dynamic inconsistency; political economy; public deficit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 E63 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2005, Revised 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform (2007)
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