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How much of Federalism in the European Union

Frantisek Turnovec ()

No 2009/19, Working Papers IES from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies

Abstract: The European Union (EU) is not de jure a federation, but after 50 years of institutional evolution it possesses attributes of a federal state. One can conclude that EU is “something between” federation and intergovernmental organization. If we measure “something between” by interval [0, 1], where 0 means fully intergovernmental organization and 1 means de facto federation, the questions are: What is the location of recent EU on this interval? What tendency of development of this location can be observed in time? In this paper we propose such a measure based on game-theoretical model of European Union decision making system.

Keywords: Co-decision procedure; committee system; consultation procedure; European Union decision making; federation; intergovernmental organization; qualified majority; power indices; simple voting committee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2009-06, Revised 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pbe
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