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Governance of the Knowlege-Intersive Firm

Vicente Salas Fumás ()
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No 201096, Working Papers from Fundacion BBVA / BBVA Foundation

Abstract: In this working paper we model contracting for joint production between workers and shareholders when investment in knowledge is non-verifiable, and the resulting specific human capital embedded int he workers is non-tradable. The model provides sufficient conditions for workers becoming stakeholders of the firm, and conditions under which it is in the interest of shareholders to empower workers and/or increase their employability as a way to motivate workers investment in knowledge. Problems of implementation of bilateral and trilateral governance mechanisms for the knowledge-intensive firm, which substitute for the hierarchical, shareholder-oriented mechanism of the physical capital-intensive firm, are highlighted.

Keywords: Corporate governance; specific human capital; stakeholders; knowledge management. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47
Date: 2007-11
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