La ségrégation spatiale selon Schelling: la perversité est ailleurs

Michel Forsé and Maxime Parodi
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Michel Forsé: CNRS
Maxime Parodi: Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques, http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr

No 2006-05, Documents de Travail de l'OFCE from Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE)

Abstract: In the 1970s, Thomas C. Schelling proposed a model which claimed to show that a high degree of spatial segregation can result from individual preferences which do not in themselves aim to achieve such a degree of collective segregation. A perverse effect seems therefore to occur. However, the present paper demonstrates that this model contains several biases which totally explain the obtained levels of segregation. A real weak individual demand for similar neighbours leads to low social segregation and a strong demand leads to high segregation. The link between the two is linear. The levels of entropy that are globally achieved for a given threshold of individual satisfaction are not at all surprising in relation to the laws of chance and to what each individual actually wishes

Keywords: Spatial segregation; Agent-based simulation; Entropy; Dynamic model; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 J15 R00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fce:doctra:0605

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