Which club should I attend, Dad?: Targeted socialization and production

Facundo Albornoz, Antonio Cabrales and Esther Hauk

No 2014-20, Working Papers from FEDEA

Abstract: We study a model that integrates productive and socialization efforts with network choice and parental investments. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game. We first show that individuals underinvest in productive and social effort, but that solving only the investment problem can exacerbate the misallocations due to network choice, to the point that it may generate an even lower social welfare if one of the networks is sufficiently disadvantaged. We also study the interaction of parental investment with network choice. We relate these equilibrium results with characteristics that we find in the data on economic co-authorship and field transmission between advisors and advisees.

Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-net and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Which Club Should I Attend, Dad?: Targeted Socialization and Production (2015)
Working Paper: Which club should I attend, Dad?: Targeted socialization and production (2014)
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