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Municipality secession, voter’s preference and persistence of power

Paulo Arvate and Vladimir Ponczek

No 08_07, Working Papers from Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto

Abstract: This paper attempts to evaluate municipality secession in terms of the median voter response on the executive local elections. Our results imply that incumbents in the new municipalities have a higher chance of reelection which suggests that the median voter approved the secession process. Moreover, that effect is enhanced because those parties that managed the municipality secession also had the probability of persistence in power (in more than one term) increased.

Keywords: municipality secession; reelection; voter’s preference and persistence of power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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