Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out

Juan-Camilo Cardenas, John Stranlund (stranlund@resecon.umass.edu) and Cleve Willis

Artefactual Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website

Abstract: Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Experimental evidence shows, however, that individuals do not typically behave this way; instead, they tend to strike a balance between self and group interests. From experiments performed in rural Colombia, we found that a regulatory solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare clearly did not. This occurred because individuals confronted with the regulation began to exhibit less other-regarding behavior and made choices that were more self-interested; that is, the regulation appeared to crowd out other-regarding behavior.

Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (224)

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Journal Article: Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:feb:artefa:00028

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