Know thyself: Incompetence and overconfidence

Paul Ferraro

Framed Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website

Abstract: Economic analyses of asymmetric information typically start with the assumption that individuals know more about their own characteristics than outside observers. This assumption implies that individuals can accurately assess their own competence in a given domain. However, individuals can only judge their competence if they are sufficiently competent. The relationship between competence and self-awareness explains a great deal of the overconfidence observed among economic agents. More specifically, overconfidence is inversely proportional to competence. Through a series of experiments and analyses of field data, the link between incompetence and overconfidence is confirmed and its implications for economic theory are explored.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:feb:framed:00148

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