Testing whether field auction experiments are demand revealing in practice

Jay Corrigan () and Matthew Rousu

Framed Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website

Abstract: Recent evidence suggests that participants' misunderstanding of experimental auction mechanisms can systematically bias auction results. We present a simple technique for testing whether field auction participants fully understand the demand-revealing nature of the auction mechanism and, by extension, whether auction bids provide an unbiased estimate of participants' willingness to pay.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Journal Article: Testing Whether Field Auction Experiments Are Demand Revealing in Practice (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:feb:framed:00161

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