Competition as a Savings Incentive: a Field Experiment at a Homeless Shelter

Sera Linardi () and Tomomi Tanaka

Framed Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website

Abstract: This paper describes a randomized field experiment testing the impact of a savings competition on the behavior of working homeless individuals at a transitional shelter. When monetary prizes were offered for achieving the highest saving rates within a particular month, average savings increased by $80 (a 30% increase) while income and attendance at case management meetings remained unchanged. However, repeating the competition in the following month had no effect because responsive savers selected out of the shelter after the first month. In summary, while competition can increase savings in the short run, its effect may be limited to the intensive margin and may diminish with repetition. Combined with our findings that the strongest determinant of savings is income, it appear that for transitional populations on the economic margin, policies that provide opportunities to increase income may be a more effective first step than saving incentives.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Journal Article: Competition as a savings incentive: A field experiment at a homeless shelter (2013)
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