Business Groups, Bank Control and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers

Ekkehart Boehmer

No 1999.20, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: I analyse the effect of ownership structure and bank control on performance. I employ a unique data set of 715 German takeovers to test whether group structure, large shareholders, and bank control affect their value to shareholders. First, I find that takeovers increase bidder value, but generally not that of the business group surrounding it. Second, majority owners provide no clear benefit. Third, bank control is only beneficial if it is counter-balanced by another large shareholder. Fourth, the worst takeovers are completed by firms that are majority-controlled by financial institutions.

Keywords: Business groups; German banks; Corporate governance; Takeovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-eec, nep-fin and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Business Groups, Bank Control, and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:1999.20

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