Ownership and Control in the Netherlands
Abe de Jongand,
Rezaul Kabir,
Teye Marra and
Ailsa Roell
Additional contact information
Abe de Jongand: Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Teye Marra: Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Ailsa Roell: Tilburg University, The Netherlands and Princeton University, USA
No 1999.22, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Abstract:
This paper analyses ownership and control structures of Dutch listed companies. Legislation effective since 1992 mandates all shareholders with holdings of 5 percent or more in Dutch companies to disclose their holdings. Our analysis shows that the average ownership stakes of the largest and the three largest shareholders are 27% and 41%, respectively. The average ownership stakes of banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions are relatively low. We observe that voting rights are more concentrated than ownership rights; the use of a supervisory board representing interests of different stakeholders is ubiquitous; and listed companies use different forms of antitakeover defence measures.
Keywords: Ownership; Control; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Ownership and control in the Netherlands (2001) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:1999.22
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