Ownership and Control: A Spanish Survey

Rafel Crespi-Cladera and Miguel Garcia-Cestona

No 1999.23, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: The paper analyses the ownership structure of a large sample of Spanish listed companies. The results are analysed in terms of governance implications under the agency theory context. The results show a picture with concentrated ownership where stock markets are relatively low important. Direct ownership and voting blocks, which account for indirect ownership through third companies, are larger for non-financial firms followed by families or individuals and financial firms other than banks. Nevertheless, the use of intermediate companies (pyramiding), is not frequent according to our data. Banks seem not to play the important role they did in the past and the recent privatisation reduced to a minimum level, state shareholdings on listed companies.

Keywords: Ownership; Control; Spain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:1999.23

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