Nonpoint Source Pollution Control Under Incomplete and Costly Information

Y. Hossein Farzin () and J.D. Kaplan
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J.D. Kaplan: Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,University of California, Davis

No 1999.32, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: This paper analyses the efficient management of nonpoint source pollution (NPS) under limited pollution control budget and incomplete information inherent in NPS pollution. By incorporating information acquisition into a pollution control model, it focuses on the tradeoff between data collection and treatment efforts and derives conditions under which (i) a favourable change in the state of treatment cost at one site may lead to an increase in treatment level at another site, (ii) a higher data collection cost induces more data collection, and (iii) an increase in information productivity leads to an increase in the level of data collection. A numerical simulation of the model illustrates how in managing NPS pollution the value of information acquisition depends on the degree of heterogeneity of polluting sites.

Keywords: Nonpoint Source Pollution; Uncertainty; Costly information; Constrained pollution control budget (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D81 D83 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Nonpoint Source Pollution Control under Incomplete and Costly Information (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:1999.32

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