Social Conformity in Games with Many Players
Myrna Wooders,
Edward Cartwright and
Reinhard Selten
No 2003.121, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Abstract:
In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to imitate similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such imitation can be consistent with self-interested behaviour. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few groups of similar individuals playing the same or similar strategies. In this paper we define and characterise a family of games admitting existence of approximated Nash equilibria in pure strategies that induce partition of the player sets with the desired properties. We also introduce the Conley-Wooders concept of 'crowding types' into our description players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player - those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others - and his tastes, taken to directly affect only that player. With this assumption of 'within crowding type anonymity' and a 'convexity of taste-types' assumption we show that the number of groups can be uniformly bounded.
Keywords: Social Conformity; Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Social Conformity in Games with Many Players (2003) 
Working Paper: Social Conformity in Games with Many Players (2003) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.121
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