Postprivatization Corporate Governance: the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection

Narjess Boubakri, Jean-Claude Cosset and Omrane Guedhami
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Narjess Boubakri: Hec Montreal, Montreal, Canada
Jean-Claude Cosset: Université Laval, Quebec, Canada
Omrane Guedhami: Université Laval, Quebec, Canada

No 2003.37, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. In addition to firm-level variables, investor protection, political and social stability explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. We find that the positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection and that private domestic ownership leads to higher performance.

Keywords: Corporate governance; privatization; performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-bec and nep-cfn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.37

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