New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming

Michael Finus () and Johan Eyckmans ()

No 2003.88, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open membership rule. It turns out that regional agreements are superior to a single agreement and exclusive is superior to open membership in welfare and ecological terms. Moreover, we show the importance of transfers for successful treaty-making. We relate our results to the design of current and past IEAs as well as to other issues of international policy coordination.

Keywords: Design of climate treaty protocol; Coalition formation; Non-cooperative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C68 C72 H41 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming (2006)
Working Paper: New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.88

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