International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems

Michael Finus ()

No 2004.41, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the problem of transboundary pollution. It then argues that most actual IEAs can be considered at best as third best solutions. Therefore, three questions are raised: 1) Why is there a difference between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions? 2) Which factors determine this difference? 3) Which measures can help to narrow this difference? This article attempts to answer these questions after giving an informal introduction to coalition models.

Keywords: International pollution; International environmental agreements; Treaty design; Coalition theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 H41 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.41

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