On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents

Alejandro Caparros, Abdelhakim Hammoudi and Tarik Tazdaït

No 2004.70, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous agents. We use the concept of exchanging agents to give necessary conditions for internal stability and show that refraction is a sufficient condition for the failure of an enlargement of the coalition. With heterogeneous agents we can get a situation where a group of members of an unstable coalition does not deviate, neither within the coalition nor within the extended coalition. Hence, the possibilities of agreement are richer than in the standard analysis with homogeneous agents. Examples of industrial economics are used for illustration, and an application to climate change negotiations is discussed in more detail.

Keywords: Heterogeneity; Coalition; Exchanging; Refraction; Global Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.70

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