Political Cycles: The Opposition Advantage
Pascal Gautier and
Raphael Soubeyran ()
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Pascal Gautier: GREQAM, Université d’Aix-Marseille II
No 2005.129, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur.
Keywords: Cycles; Alternation; Public goods; Advantage; Opposition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Political Cycles: the Opposition Advantage (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.129
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