Strategic Intellectual Property Rights Policy and North-South Technology Transfer

Alireza Naghavi

No 2005.18, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: This paper analyzes welfare implications of protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) in the framework of TRIPS for developing countries (South) through its impact on innovation, market structure and technology transfer. In a North-South trade environment, the South sets its IPR policy strategically to manipulate multinationals’ decisions on innovation and location. Firms can protect their technology by exporting or risk spillovers by undertaking FDI to avoid tariffs. A stringent IPR regime is always optimal for the South as it triggers technology transfer by inducing FDI in less R&D-intensive industries and stimulates innovation by pushing multinationals to deter entry in high-technology sectors.

Keywords: Intellectual property rights; Technology transfer; Multinational firms; Foreign direct investment; North-South trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F23 L11 L13 O32 O34 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int, nep-sea and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.18

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