Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Aart de Zeeuw

No 2005.41, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under farsightedness, both large and small stable coalitions can occur. In the context of a repeated game, this implies that large stable coalitions can also be sustained over time by a simple trigger mechanism, for large enough discount factors. However, if changes in time implement changes in state, this conclusion does not hold anymore: only small stable coalitions can be sustained.

Keywords: IEA’s; Coalitional stability; Dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 F42 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements (2008)
Working Paper: Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.41

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